Interchange fees are charged by a cardholder's bank (the 'issuing bank') to a merchant's bank (the 'acquiring bank') for each sales transaction made at a merchant outlet with a payment card.

Interchange fees are either agreed bilaterally, between one issuing and one acquiring bank, or multilaterally, by a number of issuing/acquiring banks or by means of a decision binding all banks participating in a payment card scheme. The industry refers to these multilateral interchange fees as "MIFs". A MIF can be a percentage, a flat fee or a combined fee (percentage and flat fee).

When a customer uses a payment card to buy from a merchant, the merchant receives from his bank (the acquiring bank) the sales price less a 'merchant service charge', the fee a merchant must pay to his bank for accepting the card as means of payment for that transaction. A large part of the merchant service charge is determined by the interchange fee. The customer's bank (the issuing bank), in turn, pays the acquiring bank the sales price minus the MIF and the sales price is deducted from the customer's bank account. The MIF is therefore a cost that is finally charged to the merchant (through the reduction of the purchase price) who passes the costs on to consumers in the price level of the good or service.

What are the Commission's competition concerns as regards interchange fees?

Continue Reading at Finexrtra

Interchange fees are charged by a cardholder's bank (the 'issuing bank') to a merchant's bank (the 'acquiring bank') for each sales transaction made at a merchant outlet with a payment card.

Interchange fees are either agreed bilaterally, between one issuing and one acquiring bank, or multilaterally, by a number of issuing/acquiring banks or by means of a decision binding all banks participating in a payment card scheme. The industry refers to these multilateral interchange fees as "MIFs". A MIF can be a percentage, a flat fee or a combined fee (percentage and flat fee).

When a customer uses a payment card to buy from a merchant, the merchant receives from his bank (the acquiring bank) the sales price less a 'merchant service charge', the fee a merchant must pay to his bank for accepting the card as means of payment for that transaction. A large part of the merchant service charge is determined by the interchange fee. The customer's bank (the issuing bank), in turn, pays the acquiring bank the sales price minus the MIF and the sales price is deducted from the customer's bank account. The MIF is therefore a cost that is finally charged to the merchant (through the reduction of the purchase price) who passes the costs on to consumers in the price level of the good or service.

What are the Commission's competition concerns as regards interchange fees?

Continue Reading at Finexrtra

Internet.com is reporting that "a number of bogus Web sites that appear to be the official pages of a pair of credit unions used by military personnel are actually phishing traps designed to steal soldiers' identities."



Phishing can be eliminated. What they are "phishing" for are online banking passwords and usernames. Get rid of the antiquated login process and start "really" getting serious about authentication.



Replicate the same trusted process to disperse cash "in real time" from an ATM and two-factor" authenticate the online banking session by having customers swipe their bank-issued card and enter their bank-issued PIN.  



Start doing that, and banks will eradicate the "phishing" problem...because there will be nothing left to phish phor.



The money banks spend "phighting" phishing can be spent providing their customers with a PCI 2.1 Certified PED resulting in the complete eradication of the threat posed.  (it would also provide an ROI to the issuing bank via interchange revenue derived from usage of the device for eCommerce purchases)



Whats the phake phishing site going to ask people to do? Swipe their card and Enter their PIN?  Worthless move.  It's instantly 3DES DUKPT encrypted inside the device and guess who "doesn't" have the encryption key? If you said the phisher you're right.  If you said the online banking customer you are also correct.  The way it's done now, the customer does have the information being phished phor.  



Translation: No more username/passwords.



Even the customer him/herself does NOT have the "information" the phishers are looking for so they cannot be "duped" into providing it.



Make sense?  When swiping the card and entering the PIN "outside the browser and inside the box" and there isn't "ANY phishable" information.





That's why Eugene Kaspersky of Kaspersky Labs last week called for "MASS adoption of peripheral card readers for ALL internet banking customers. (see top left...and click the top right sidebar graphic for the complete story)

Internet.com is reporting that "a number of bogus Web sites that appear to be the official pages of a pair of credit unions used by military personnel are actually phishing traps designed to steal soldiers' identities."



Phishing can be eliminated. What they are "phishing" for are online banking passwords and usernames. Get rid of the antiquated login process and start "really" getting serious about authentication.



Replicate the same trusted process to disperse cash "in real time" from an ATM and two-factor" authenticate the online banking session by having customers swipe their bank-issued card and enter their bank-issued PIN.  



Start doing that, and banks will eradicate the "phishing" problem...because there will be nothing left to phish phor.



The money banks spend "phighting" phishing can be spent providing their customers with a PCI 2.1 Certified PED resulting in the complete eradication of the threat posed.  (it would also provide an ROI to the issuing bank via interchange revenue derived from usage of the device for eCommerce purchases)



Whats the phake phishing site going to ask people to do? Swipe their card and Enter their PIN?  Worthless move.  It's instantly 3DES DUKPT encrypted inside the device and guess who "doesn't" have the encryption key? If you said the phisher you're right.  If you said the online banking customer you are also correct.  The way it's done now, the customer does have the information being phished phor.  



Translation: No more username/passwords.



Even the customer him/herself does NOT have the "information" the phishers are looking for so they cannot be "duped" into providing it.



Make sense?  When swiping the card and entering the PIN "outside the browser and inside the box" and there isn't "ANY phishable" information.





That's why Eugene Kaspersky of Kaspersky Labs last week called for "MASS adoption of peripheral card readers for ALL internet banking customers. (see top left...and click the top right sidebar graphic for the complete story)

• The location of where transactions were made.


• The identity of the merchant processing the transaction.


• The type of credit card transaction.


• Identity of the mortgage lender.


• Use of such information in credit decisions 

• The location of where transactions were made.


• The identity of the merchant processing the transaction.


• The type of credit card transaction.


• Identity of the mortgage lender.


• Use of such information in credit decisions