Showing posts with label online banking. Show all posts
Showing posts with label online banking. Show all posts

From Softpedia



A Californian escrow firm that had $465,000 stolen from its bank account, with the help of a computer trojan, was forced to sign up for a loan to replace the missing funds.



The cybercrooks responsible defeated several online banking security measures in order to steal the money.



According to Krebs on Security, the security breach occurred sometime in March, when the owner of California-based Village View Escrow opened the attachment on a fake email about an undelivered UPS package. The file installed a banking trojan, which immediately started to record and relay valuable information, like the online banking password, back to the cybercrooks.




Owner Michelle Marisco said her financial institution at the time — Professional Business Bank of Pasedena, Calif. – normally notified her by e-mail each time a new wire was sent out of the company’s escrow account. But the attackers apparently disabled that feature before initiating the fraudulent wires.






This case stands out from the pile of other similar incidents that occurred in the past year, because it really outlines the complexity of these malware threats. For example, the company's bank - which, as in other cases, refused to take responsibility - told the owner that the fraudulent transactions were issued from their regular IP address. This means attackers used an advanced connection tunneling feature that trojans like Zbot have in their arsenal.



Furthermore, the fraudsters managed to disable the normal email notifications sent out by the online banking system after each transaction. This left the company totally in the dark about what was going on.



Apparently, there was also human error involved, as every transaction required approval from two distinct people in the company, the owner and their assistant. However, after failing to view information about that undelivered UPS package, the owner forwarded the malicious email to their assistant and had them check it out as well.



The crooks initiated two international money transfers of $88,000 and $94,000 directly to bank accounts in Latvia. This is also unusual behavior, because such fraudulent transfers are usually kept under the $10,000 limit and sent to accounts held with domestic banks. The rest of the stolen money was transferred to mules in the United States in order to be wired outside of the country.



The bank was only able to reverse transfers amounting to $70,000, leaving Village View Escrow short of $395,000, that were actually other people's deposits for real estate deals


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Posted by John B. Frank Tuesday, June 29, 2010 0 comments

Research and Markets: Case Study: The Underground Economy of the Zeus Banking Trojan Horse



DUBLIN--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Research and Markets has announced the addition of the "Case Study: The Underground Economy of the Zeus Banking Trojan Horse" report to their offering.
“Case Study: The Underground Economy of the Zeus Banking Trojan Horse”
The banking Trojan horse ZeuS is one of todays biggest threats towards online banking. Being used to attack both companies and private individuals, this malware undergoes frequent mutations which demonstrate how technically innovative its author is.
http://www.researchandmarkets.comThanks to its technical nature and great flexibility, over the years ZeuS malware has become a major and long-term threat. First identified by researchers in 2006, this malware is a Trojan horse specialized in stealing banking credentials which directly attacks its victims web browser. The malware is also equipped with numerous high tech functions, including customer certificate theft, transparent redirection, on-the-fly rewriting of HTML pages and requested transactions, real-time notification of hackers, and complete take over of the infected machine. Identified in 2007 under the name of UpLevel, the author of ZeuS has surrounded itself with a close inner circle that is responsible for selling the malware. Numerous public versions are available at low prices or even free of charge. As these versions generally contain backdoors, they are reserved for amateur fraudsters, while private versions of ZeuS are sold for several thousands of dollars.
One group, included among the top ZeuS customers, operates a botnet comprising several tens of thousands of computers, specialized in stealing money via the ACH network in the United States.
The publisher's recommendation to banks is to adopt, if they haven't already done so, an authentication mechanism for online banking that is entirely multi-channel, meaning that no convergence point between the two channels exists. The web browsers used by banking customers must be considered first and foremost as a threat for online banking, and not merely as an opportunity to introduce new online services.
Key Topics Covered:
1 Introduction
2 An Expertise in Bank Data Theft
3 The Authors Multiple Faces
4 The Prevalence of ZeuS Infections
5 Analysis of ZeuS users
6 Analysis of ZeuS Targets
7 Risks Analysis
8 Recommendations

Contacts

Research and Markets

Laura Wood, Senior Manager

press@researchandmarkets.com

U.S. Fax: 646-607-1907

Fax (outside U.S.): +353-1-481-1716
Permalink: http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100625005559/en/Research-Markets-Case-Study-Underground-Economy-Zeus


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Posted by John B. Frank Friday, June 25, 2010 0 comments

New Gateway Empowers Banks to Quickly Add Out-of-Band Authentication to Any Online Banking Platform

OVERLAND PARK, KS--(Marketwire - June 23, 2010) -  PhoneFactor, Inc., a leading global provider of multi-factor authentication services, today announced that it has extended its suite of out-of-band authentication solutions for online banking to include a Universal Banking Gateway, enabling rapid implementation with any online banking platform and no coding. The Gateway adds a critical authentication layer to secure online banking logins and transactions without requiring direct integration with the online banking application.
PhoneFactor works by confirming online banking logins, ACH, wire transfers and bill pay processes through an out-of-band phone call or text message. The user simply answers the call or responds to the text message to authenticate. Because the authentication is confirmed through the telephone network, it protects against escalating threats from man-in-the-middle attacks and online banking trojans.
The new Gateway makes it possible to add PhoneFactor authentication to online banking applications that are deployed as managed services and other cases where the application's authentication logic is not accessible to the bank. The Universal Banking Gateway is available immediately as one of the integration options bundled into the PhoneFactor platform. PhoneFactor also supports direct integration via web plug-ins for Java and .Net and a Web Services SDK, and has partnered with leading banking platform providers, such as Fiserv, to provide native integration.
"With attacks from online banking trojans growing exponentially, banks are feeling the pressure to quickly deploy the out-of-band authentication needed to protect their customers," said Steve Dispensa. "Now, it's easier than ever for banks to deploy PhoneFactor, regardless of their online banking systems. Banks can take control of the implementation timeline and quickly roll the service out to their users."
With PhoneFactor there are no security tokens, software or certificates to deploy to end users, so the enrollment process is simple and fully automated. No user training is required, and very little ongoing user support is required. Customer acceptance of PhoneFactor continues to grow in every industry, but the security and usability of the solution make it ideal for online banking. Today, PhoneFactor authenticates millions of online banking logins and transactions for leading financial institutions.
About PhoneFactorPhoneFactor is a leading provider of multi-factor authentication services. The company's award-winning platform by the same name uses any phone as a second form of authentication. PhoneFactor's out-of-band architecture and real-time fraud alerts provide strong security for enterprise and consumer applications. It is easy and cost effective to set up and deploy to large numbers of geographically diverse users. PhoneFactor was recently named to the Bank Technology News FutureNow list of the top 10 technology innovators securing the banking industry today and a finalist in 2010 SC Magazine Reader Trust Awards. Learn more atwww.phonefactor.com.


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Posted by John B. Frank Thursday, June 24, 2010 0 comments

European Banks:  29
American Banks: Zero
During the course of the past year, I have made a huge effort to point out that online banking (the way it is conducted now) is doomed for failure. (see related posts below)  I started with a series I called: "Online Banking is Weak Week."

Bottom line?  Online Banking MUST be done "outside" the browser space.  We've seen the ZeuS, Clampi, URLZone, BlackEnergy2 banking trojans, we've seen lawsuits filed by customers against banks accusing them of lax authentication procedures, we've see keylogging, man in the middle and man in the browser attacks, we've seen billions of phishing attempts, we've seen the head of the FBI swear off online banking, we've been told we need a "dedicated" machine for online banking.  We've seen Avivah state that nothing in the browser can be trusted, I can go on and on... and I will because...




OTP's (One Time Passwords) will be circumvented
by MITB attacks. (and real-time keylogging)
American banks go on and on with their belief they can protect the security of their customers by asking them to type data into boxes in a browser.  (European Banks are trending towards issuing card readers and almost 30 percent (see chart above) of European online banking customers use a card reader)

Either I don't get it or the banks don't.  I'm confident enough to say that if you were to go back through the PIN Debit blog over the past 18 months or so and look at everything I've posted regarding online banking, you will see that I'm not the one who doesn't get it.  (type "online banking security" into the custom search box for proof)

I'm not Nostradamus, but I can tell you this.  Banks would "prophet" from the eradication of all the problems associated with Typing vs. Swiping.

When Kaspersky Labs calls for the mass adoption of peripheral card readers and suggests that banks could be big drivers of this type of hardware, then banks might want to pay more attention.  On the horizon is a new dilemma for online banking security.  



Avivah Litan, distinguished analyst from Gartner Research points out that banks rely on "flash cookies" to identify legitimate users and that's about to change.    Again...Why not use a common sense approach to authenticate legitimate users.  Take your "bank issued" card out of your purse/wallet and swipe it through a PCI certified PIN Entry Device designed for online commerce and securely enter your PIN.  What you have (card) and what you know (PIN) is entered into what the bank owns (the peripheral PED card reader)  


Adobe Flash Player Private Browsing May Force Change in Fraud Fight 


A report from Gartner highlights how the reliance on Flash cookies as an authentication mechanism by online banks may need to change with the release of Adobe Flash Player 10.1. Flash Player's "Private Browsing" feature will make it easier to clear Flash cookies, and e-commerce businesses will need to adjust, some say.


Banks Should Be Big Drivers
of this kind of hardware.  First
they need to admit that they're
in a losing battle with hackers
and must stop with the band-aid
responses to the real threats they face.
When the final version of Adobe Flash Player 10.1 hits desktops later this year, it will bring with it new functionality designed to allow users to automatically clear Flash cookies after a Web session. But while the feature may be lauded in the name of privacy, it may also force online banks to change how they fight fraud.

Flash cookies, also known as LSO (local shared objects), are used by many banks and e-commerce sites to identify legitimate users and block unauthorized or fraudulent access. In a report entitled, "Privacy Collides With Fraud Detection and Crumbles Flash Cookies," Gartner analyst Avivah Litan writes that the practice of using HTTP browser cookies for authentication gained steam roughly three years ago due to guidelines imposed by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council.

“Most banks responded by implementing stronger authentication that depended in large part on knowing that their online banking customer was logging in from a known PC,” Litan wrote.

“Upon entering a user ID to log into an online banking session, the bank Web server would check for the presence of this cookie…If the bank software could not find the cookie – for example because the user was logging in from a different PC – then the bank software would generally challenge the user with a series of questions that only the legitimate user could presumably answer.”

But a growing desire for privacy led users to delete their browser cookies more often, meaning banks had to find something else to rely on, the report noted. Enter Flash LSOs, which are “basically hidden from casual users who aren’t aware of them and don’t know how to delete them.”

Now that approach could be threatened as well, Litan told eWEEK...<<read more>>


Read more: http://pindebit.blogspot.com/2010/06/yet-another-reason-banks-should-call.html#ixzz0rEqSGASJ
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Posted by John B. Frank Friday, June 18, 2010 0 comments

There's a great article today on Network World written by Ellen Messmer. Here's a sampling and my thoughts about the article (which I shared with Ms. Messmer)

Providing online bank customers with security software an imperfect cybercrime antidote
By Ellen Messmer, Network World  

In online banking and payments, customers' PCs have become the Achilles' heel of the financial industry as cyber-crooks remotely take control of the computers to make unauthorized funds transfers, often to faraway places. The dilemma for banks boils down to this:

How far can they go to help protect customer desktops that function like part of their shared network but aren't owned by the bank?

MY Answer: How about they provide something that IS owned by the bank (and uses existing bank rails) i.e.: Issue bank-owned PCI Certified PEDs...so they have a dedicated machine for online banking.

Banks are faced with the prospect that "customers own PCs that have been in the hands of Russian crime syndicates," says Jeff Theiler, senior vice president at Hancock Bank, which primarily operates along the Gulf Coast region. Like many other banks, Hancock finds itself getting more involved in helping customers defend their machines. <>

Editor's Note: Here's my response to Ellen's story (which was picked up by BusinessWeek today)...

Good morning Ellen: I enjoyed your article today on Network World and thought you might be interested in hearing that there is indeed a simple solution to the online banking problem to which you refer, specifically:  "The dilemma for banks boils down to this: How far can they go to help protect customer desktops that function like part of their shared network but aren't owned by the bank?"


Question: If you are 2000 miles from your bank, at 2:00 AM and need $200.00 what process is trusted to authenticate you and disperse the $200?
Answer: You insert/swipe your "bank issued card" then enter your "bank issued PIN" into a "bank owned ATM" and voilla. In seconds, you get your $200. That same trusted process is what should be used to authenticate online banking sessions.


Did you know that in Europe, almost 30% of consumers use a card reader for online banking (see graphic above) In America that number is ZERO.


Cost? WAY Less than what banks are already dishing out for "useless giveways. (When I say "useless" I am simply implying that the promotions they run don't "solve the problem.") The purpose of these give
aways is to attract customers. Well guess what? The purpose of "typing" is to provide online banking credential "giveaways" to the hackers, keyloggers and/or phishermen.


Consumers are already clamoring for a more secure online banking login process and they would "flock" towards the most secure online banking site in America, which is what a bank that deploys PCI Certified PED's to their online banking customers would become. Do you doubt me? Ask your friends. Would they rather type their online banking credentials into a box in a browser or swipe their card and enter their PIN?


Our device plugs into the USB port or smartphone and encrypts the cardholder data (including the Track 2 data) at the maghead using 3DES encryption. It then DUKPT encrypts the PIN for the only genuine end-to-end encryption.


The most important thing our device does is it "eliminates" typing "login" data into a box in a browser. That's the inherent problem. That's why (as you mention in your article) the Russian's get/got control of the PC's. (malware/phishing) Our PED eliminates the usage of inadequate and way obsolete "username/password" login...thus it eliminates phishing.


What do phishers phish phor? "Online Banking Credentials" AND "credit/debit card numbers. How do they get them? They fool people into thinking they are "typing" their card numbers/online banking authentication into a legitimate site when in fact it is not. That problem would be "eradicated" with our device.


Thus if all a banks customers securely login by doing what they do at an ATM, swipe their bank issued card, enter their bank issued PIN and do it on a bank issued PCI certified PIN Entry Device the problem created by "typing" would be eliminated by "swiping."I'd be happy to provide further insight as to why this is a "no-brainer" for banks to deploy.


Kaspersky Labs (which provides software security) knows that hardware is required as their recent proclamation calling for "mass adoption of card readers" professes. Software helps but at the end of the day it is simply a band-aid.


The internet was NOT designed to conduct financial transactions. It's called a "browser" for a reason and between malware, keylogging and phishing, the only solution to the problem is to replicate what we do at ATM's and/or brick and mortar retailers. Swipe vs. Type. As I like to say on the company blog. "If someone is going to "Swipe" your card information online, shouldn't it be you?


Question: Why would banks want to fork out $18 to give their customer a PCI Certified PED?
Answer: Well besides the obvious (they would save the millions of dollars lost to phishing) online banking is destined to fail. Most everyone is aware that fraud is running at epidemic levels and that what banks report is only a fraction of the real losses. (see graphic on right)


Other benefits: In addition to providing "True Two-Factor Authentication (and NO, a username and password is NOT really 2FA) Our device also completely eliminates the threats and fraud losses/costs created by typing...AND there is a return on investment in the form of Interchange revenue every time the device is used for online shopping or P2P payments.

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Read more: http://pindebit.blogspot.com/2010/06/bankings-big-dilemma-how-to-stop.html#ixzz0rEp43m6O
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Posted by John B. Frank 0 comments

Internet.com is reporting that "a number of bogus Web sites that appear to be the official pages of a pair of credit unions used by military personnel are actually phishing traps designed to steal soldiers' identities."



Phishing can be eliminated. What they are "phishing" for are online banking passwords and usernames. Get rid of the antiquated login process and start "really" getting serious about authentication.



Replicate the same trusted process to disperse cash "in real time" from an ATM and two-factor" authenticate the online banking session by having customers swipe their bank-issued card and enter their bank-issued PIN.  



Start doing that, and banks will eradicate the "phishing" problem...because there will be nothing left to phish phor.



The money banks spend "phighting" phishing can be spent providing their customers with a PCI 2.1 Certified PED resulting in the complete eradication of the threat posed.  (it would also provide an ROI to the issuing bank via interchange revenue derived from usage of the device for eCommerce purchases)



Whats the phake phishing site going to ask people to do? Swipe their card and Enter their PIN?  Worthless move.  It's instantly 3DES DUKPT encrypted inside the device and guess who "doesn't" have the encryption key? If you said the phisher you're right.  If you said the online banking customer you are also correct.  The way it's done now, the customer does have the information being phished phor.  



Translation: No more username/passwords.



Even the customer him/herself does NOT have the "information" the phishers are looking for so they cannot be "duped" into providing it.



Make sense?  When swiping the card and entering the PIN "outside the browser and inside the box" and there isn't "ANY phishable" information.






That's why Eugene Kaspersky of Kaspersky Labs last week called for "MASS adoption of peripheral card readers for ALL internet banking customers. (see top left...and click the top right sidebar graphic for the complete story)



May 28, 2010  By Larry Barrett


Phishers don't play favorites and their latest intended victims are the men and women in uniform.









As eSecurity Planet discovered, several clever phishing traps have popped up online in the past year with almost the exact same look and feel of a pair of popular credit unions primarily used by folks serving in the U.S. military.


Security software experts are warning customers of both USAA, an insurance and financial services firm, and the Navy Federal Credit Union to be especially vigilant before divulging their Social Security numbers, passwords, account numbers and other personally identifying information.
Symantec said this latest attack comes from Web sites hosted on servers in Taiwan and variants of this particular phishing URLs have been used to spoof other online brands as well.

U.S. Strategic Command officials are joining leading security software vendors in warning soldiers serving in the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps to be on high alert for a new phishing scam that targeting customers at a pair of credit unions catering to servicemen and their families.
Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, the STRATCOM commander, is warning soldiers and their families that bogus Web sites imitating both USAA, a popular insurance and financial services firm catering to military families, and the Navy Federal Credit Union have successfully stolen the personal and banking data of an unknown number of customers. 

Read the full story at eSecurity Planet: 

Phishing Scam Targets Military Credit Unions





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Posted by John B. Frank Saturday, May 29, 2010 0 comments

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